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THE MOAKLEY -DeCONCINI BILL 
The situation facing refugees in flight from 
civil strife in El Salvador has changed little 
since 1983 when legislation was first intro- 
duced that would provide Salvadorans 
limited protection in the U.S. The legal 
context, however, of conditions facing the 
undocumented refugee community has 
changed significantly. Within the past 
year, the U.S. has experienced dramatic 
changes in immigration/political asylum 
law and practice. Recent legislation and 
litigation have produced new policy 
responses to a number of relevant issues 
involving reception of the undocumented 
asylum seeker in the U.S. Landmark 
changes in immigration policy include: 
passage of the Immigration Control and re- 
form Act (IRCA); the decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court (in Cardoza-Fonseca) to 
affirm the more objective "well-founded 
fear of persecution" asylum standard; the 
well publicized announcement by Attor- 
ney General Meese regarding preferential 
treatment and protection of Nicaraguans 
here by granting them rights already due 
Nicaraguans and others presently in the 
U.S.; prosecution and conviction of sanc- 
tuary workers providing refuge to refugees 
from El Salvador and Guatemala; expan- 
sion of immigration detention sites 
throughout the U.S. for incarceration of 
asylum seekers; and completion of two rel- 
evant General Accounting Office (GAO) 
studies regarding a) discrimination against 
Salvadorans in political asylum adjudica- 
tion practice, and b) inconclusive analysis 
of evidence claiming safe return for repa- 
triated Salvadorans. These significant 
events are exacerbated by proposed 
changes in Canadian immigration policy 
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work authorization by the I.N.S. even 
though the I.N.S. regulations explicitly 
state that refugees who present "non- 
frivolous" applications for political asy- 
lum should be granted permission to work. 
For the second point, those Central Ameri- 
cans who do not qualify for legalization 
under the Amnesty Law, will be deeply af- 
fected by the employer sanctions, by 
which employers of "illegal immigrants" 
and others without work authorization are 
subjected to fines and penalties. These 
sanctions will only serve to marginalize 
many sectors of the Central American im- 
migrant community, lowering their 
already poor standard of living and in- 
creasing employer exploitation. Fear of 
detection and subsequent deportation will 
force many refugees to tolerate victimiza- 
tion, exploitation and racism by employ- 
ers. Refugee organizations are already 
reporting massive layoffs of workers who 
are unable to prove that they were author- 
ized to work in the United States even 
before the imposition of employer 
sanctions. Many refugees have reported 
that their wages have already been lowered 
by employers who are taking advantage of 
the vulnerability of the workers who do not 
have work authorization. 
The I.N. S. has stated that the "alternative" 
to legalization for the hundreds of 
thousands of Central American refugees 
who do not qualify for legalization con- 
tinues to be application for political asylum. 
However, applying for political asylum has 
not proven to be a viable option for these 
refugees due to the disproportionate denial 
rate. Statistics show that from the period 
1981 through 1984, more than 32,241 
Salvadoran refugees applied for political 
asylum in the United States. Five hundred 
and sixty two of those applications were ap- 
proved, while another 20,833 applicants 
were denied, an approval rate of less than 3 
per cent. The approval rate is even lower for 
Guatemalan refugees. 
In response to the growing concern over 
the future impact of the new Immigration 
and Reform Control Act on their lives, 
many Central American refugees began. to 
flee to Canada in late 1986, presenting 
themselves at the border where thev 
requested political asylum. Canada, under 
its Ministerial Permit program in existence 
at that time, was not deporting Central 
American refugees and routinely issued 
ministerial permits to refuge-seekers origi- 
nating from a list of 18 countries which in- 
cluded El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Refugees from these countries were al- 
lowed to stay in Canada and given work 
permits while awaiting a determination of 
their cases. This special program was 
abruptly ended by the Canadian govern- 
ment on February 20, 1987, in light of the 
flow of refugees requesting political asy- 
lum at Canadian borders at the rate of 
1,000 to 1,200 arrivals per week. 
The Canadian government has subsequent- 
ly reiterated its commitment to lend its hand 
in alleviating the Central American refugee 
problem by encouraging Central Ameri- 
cans to apply for political asylum outside 
Canada at the nearest Canadian Consulate. 
However, Canada has put restrictions on 
the number of refugees it will sponsor a 
year. In 1986, the Canadian government 
only sponsored approximately 3,300 Cen- 
tral American refugees, a very small num- 
ber considering that since the civil war in El 
Salvador approximately one fifth of the 
population was forced to flee the country. 
The Canadian government's recent in- 
crease of restrictions on access of Central 
American refugees to Canada, and the 
U. S.government's attempt to stem the 
flow of illegal immigration by passing em- 
ployer sanctions, only shows that these 
governments are refusing to deal with the 
root causes of the refugee problems: these 
aie the civil conflict and persecution exist- 
ing in their Central American countries of 
origin which cause them to flee. 
It is clear that what is needed is a regional 
response to the growing number of Central 
Americans who are fleeing their 
homelands. The United States, along with 
Mexico, Canada and other countries in the 
region should commit themselves to the 
international principle of non-refoulement 
(no forced) return for Central American 
refugees. A temporary haven should be 
granted to these refugees who because of 
the violence and civil unrest in their 
homelands cannot safely return. Passage 
of such proposed legislation as the (U.S.) 
Moakley-Deconcini refugee protection 
bill which would grant a temporary 
suspension to the detention and deporta- 
tion of Salvadoran refugees in the U.S. 
would be a step in the right direction to- 
ward alleviating the plight of the Central 
American refugees. 
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that would restrict reception of Salvadoran 
refugees coming directly from the United 
States (in particular, new legislation bills 
C-84 and C-55). 
As such policies were lobbied for, voted 
upon and implemented in Washington, 
D.C., the United States was experiencing 
a heavy refugee influx from El Salvador. 
Mass migration from the region, caused by 
El Salvador's civil war, has brought 
hundreds of thousands of undocumented 
refugees to the U.S.. By 1987, more than 
20% of El Salvador's population had be- 
come refugees or displaced persons within 
the country. In addition to United Nations, 
church, and government refugee camps 
established in Mexico, Honduras and 
other Central American countries, great 
numbers of refugees sought first asylum in 
the U.S., in Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Chicago, New York, Miami, Boston and, 
perhaps, ironically, in Washington, D.C. 
where policies restricting refugee protec- 
tion are formulated. 
The above provides a backdrop in discus- 
sion of the labored Salvadoran safe haven 
bill sponsored by Rep. Moakley (D-MA) 
of the House of Representatives and Sena- 
tor DeConcini (D-AZ) on the Senate side. 
In its four year legislative history, the 
Moakley-DeConcini bill has made limited 
headway amid a dramatically changing 
landscape of immigration law. Despite its 
legacy of testimony covering issues on the 
root causes of civil strife in Central 
America and U.S. practice in the region, 
the Moakley-DeConcini bill has moved 
slowly in comparison to other initiatives. 
Progress, however, is on the horizon. On 
July 28, 1987, the U.S. House of 
Representatives unanimously passed the 
Moakley bill (renamed the Central 
American Studies and Temporary Relief 
Act of 1987). Later this Fall, the DeCon- 
cini bill is expected to reach the Senate 
floor for a final vote. With significant 
amendments attached to the bills, the con- 
ference committee selected to reconcile 
the differences between the House and 
Senate version will play a significant role. 
Legislative History 
Generated in response to conditions of 
warfare, human rights abuses and violence 
in El Salvador, the Moakley-DeConcini 
(herein referred to as Moakley) bill was in- 
itially drafted in support of providing tem- 
porary safety for an estimated quarter mil- 
lion refugees in the U.S. Now, four years 
later, after nearly 70,000 civilians have 
lost their lives to war in El Salvador, and 
as hundreds of thousands have become 
displaced within the region of Honduras, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Belize, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica, more than 500,000 Salva- 
dorans seek safe haven in the U.S. With 
worsening political and economic con- 
ditions and increased destruction of life 
and property, El Salvador continues to be a 
country ravaged by a nine year civil war. 
As other forms of protection are offered to 
nationalities from countries in similar 
circumstances, such as Poles, Afghanis, 
and Ethiopians, Salvadorans still do not 
receive blanket protection. Political asy- 
lum approval rates for Salvadorans are 
abysmally low. As the subject of a recent 
GAO study investigating apparent dis- 
crimination in adjudication of asylum 
claims, Salvadoran asylum applicants 
currently average a less than 3% approval 
rate, as compared, for example, to an 85% 
approval rate to date for Nicaraguans.' 
Further. Salvadorans have become the 
typical detainee in any one of the Immigra- 
tion Service's many immigration deten- 
tion centers. These centers, or irnrnigra- 
tion prisons, incarcerate undocumented 
persons for lengthy periods for having vio- 
lated the crime of illegal entry. Salvado- 
rans are routinely detained and deported 
without benefit of counsel. 
In response, after years of denied requests 
to the U. S. Government to grant Extended 
Voluntary Departure (E. V. D. ) to Salvado- 
rans, refugee advocates turned to 
sympathetic Congressional members for 
support. Out of this effort, Representative 
J.Moakley offered his first House resolu- 
tion favoring suspension of detention and 
deportation for Salvadorans in the U.S. 
Initially begun as a Sense of Congress Res- 
olution, the Moakley bill was first drafted 
and passed in 1983 as a non-binding ges- 
ture in support of providing temporary safe 
haven for Salvadoran refugees. Now 
before the 100th Congress, four years lat- 
er, the Moakley bill has inched its way 
closer to final passage. 
In brief, the Moakley bill provides for an 
in-depth GAO study that will investigate 
and report to Congress on conditions for 
the displaced within El Salvador and 
throughout the region. The study will also 
include an examination and analysis of 
conditions facing those deported from the 
U.S. back to El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
An especially interesting addition to the 
bill includes a comparative analysis of the 
treatment and reception of Salvadorans 
and Nicaraguans in the U.S. vis-a-vis 
the situation of other nationals in the 
U.S. who have been granted Extended 
Voluntary Departure. Special attention 
will also be paid to the situation of un- 
documented Salvadorans in the U.S. A 
suspension of detention and deportation 
will be granted to Salvadorans lending 
completion and review of the study. 
This GAO study will conclude with a 
Congressional review of the report's 
findings. Upon review, Congress will 
implement appropriate steps in accord- 
ance with the report's conclusions. 
Relatively limited in language the bill has 
raised relevant issues f& and above the 
few remedies it seeks. With issues perti- 
nent to refugee protection, domestic and 
foreign policy, discrimination and human 
rights, the Moakley bill has represented 
hope and haven to an estimated half mil- 
lion Salvadoran refugees seeking first asy- 
lum in the U.S. The language of the bill 
has changed much over time in incremen- 
tal concessions to Congressional members 
seeking to dilute the political issues inher- 
ent in the bill. Rarely acknowledged offi- 
cially, the unspoken subtext of the bill re- 
lated immigration policy to foreign policy 
objectives. In essence, recognition of 
Salvadorans as refugees in the U.S. would 
directly contradict administration claims 
that conditions in El Salvador are improv- 
ing and that President Duarte is in control 
of the military and paramilitary death 
squads. 
Like most legislation, components of the 
bill have been criticized by those on both 
sides of the issues involved. Staunch 
advocates favoring refugee rights have 
recently withdrawn support of the bill in 
rejection of the many concessions added 
over time; others dub the bill an open door 
to "economic migrants" and allege that 
refugees will falsely claim fear of persecu- 
tion in Central America in order to gain en- 
try to the U.S. Long considered a liberal 
gesture supported almost exclusively by 
Democrats, the bill has been transformed 
year after year in an attempt to capture bi- 
partisan support, A number of incremental 
changes have fundamentally altered the 
bill. A major change involves inclusion of 
Nicaraguans, added to broaden Congres- 
sional support. Other changes included re- 
strictive language to limit those who might 
qualify. 
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